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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to evaluate a “couples-based” policy intervention designed to reduce the 
number of Australian families without work.  In 2000 and 2001, the Australian Government piloted a new 
counseling initiative targeted towards couple-headed families with dependent children in which neither 
partner was in paid employment.  Selected women on family benefits (who were partnered with men 
receiving unemployment benefits) were randomly invited to participate in an interview process designed to 
identify strategies for increasing economic and social participation. While some women were interviewed 
on their own, others participated in a joint interview with their partners.  Our results indicate that the 
overall effect of the interview process led to lower hours of work among family benefit recipients in the 
intervention group than the control group, but to greater participation and hours in job search and in study 
or training for work-related reasons.  Whether women were interviewed with their partner or not had no 
effect on the level of economic and social activity of participants. 
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 I.   Introduction 
  The shares of fully-employed and workless families have both risen over the past 
two decades leaving employment in many countries increasingly concentrated (polarized) 
within certain households.
1  Shifts in family composition toward more single-adult 
households—in which rates of non-employment are typically higher—account for only a 
small fraction of the rise in the overall fraction of workless households (for example, 
Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; 2000; Dawkins et al. 2002b).  More important has been the 
increasing concentration of non-employment within households.     
The impact of these changes on children is of particular concern.  While the proportion of 
couple-headed households in which both partners are employed has increased, so too has 
the incidence of joblessness (for example, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; OECD, 1998; 
Dawkins et al. 2002a; Gregory, 1999; Dorsett, 2001).  Substantial numbers of children 
now grow up in families reliant on income support that have no earned income. Between 
1986 and 1999, the number of Australian children living in workless households more 
than doubled, leaving 1.2 million children—almost one in four—living in families reliant 
on income support (McCoull and Pech, 2000).  Similarly, despite near-record levels of 
employment, nearly one in five British children now live in families in which no adult is 
in paid employment (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000).  Most troubling is the link between 
                                                           
1 See OECD (1998) and Gregg and Wadsworth (1996, 1998, 2000) for evidence on employment 
polarization in OECD countries generally, and in the United Kingdom in particular.  Dawkins et al. (2002a, 
2002b), Gregory (1999), and Miller (1997) discuss the Australian evidence.       
  1joblessness and poverty and the fear that children growing up in poor households have 
above average probabilities of adverse outcomes as adults.
 2  
Given these trends, it seems sensible for policy makers to specifically target 
workless families when implementing labor market programs.  In the U.K, for example, 
the New Deal for Partners offers–on a voluntary basis–job search assistance and training 
opportunities to partners of income-support recipients.  Many young, workless couples 
without dependent children are required to file a Joint Claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA).
3  The joint claim process requires both partners to be available for work and to 
accept equal responsibility for reporting any change in circumstances.   This “couples-
based” approach is consistent with recent research (see Dorsett 2001) which suggests that 
to be effective in addressing joblessness at a household level, employment policies must 
explicitly take into account the joint (as opposed to individual) nature of labor supply 
decisions within families.                 
There is a large international literature pointing to an inverse relationship between 
husbands’ unemployment and wives’ labor supply (see Davies et al. 1992; Dilnot and 
Kell, 1987; and the references therein).  While much of this can be accounted for by 
correlation between husbands and wives in key factors associated with non-employment 
                                                           
2 In Britain, 89.2 percent of workless couples with children live in poverty (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000), 
while 74 percent of similar Australian families are in the poorest income quintile (Dawkins, et al, 2002b).  
Israel and Seeborg (1998) discuss a range of factors influencing the likelihood that impoverished youth will 
escape poverty, while in related reviews Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Haveman et. al. (2001) discuss 
the results of a large literature linking family and community investments in children and children’s 
subsequent outcomes. 
3 See the website for the U.K. Department for Work and Pensions (http://sss,dwp.gov.uk) ,  and Bonjour et 
al. (2001; 2002) for more details about these two programs.  
  2(for example, low skills or poor labor market conditions), a large share is due to cross-
couple state dependence (Davies et al. 1992).  Tax and benefit-induced disincentives to 
work, which are inherent in many income-support systems (Dilnot and Kell, 1987), may 
contribute to low employment rates among the wives of unemployed men.  Given this, 
policy initiatives to help workless couples must be undertaken within the context of the 
income-support system. 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate one such “couples-based” policy intervention 
in Australia.  Between September 2000 and April 2001, the Australian Department of 
Family and Community Services (FaCS) trialed a new counseling initiative targeted 
towards couple-headed families with dependent children in which neither partner was in 
paid employment.  Selected women on Parenting Payments Partnered (see below), who 
were partnered with men receiving Newstart (unemployment) benefits were invited to 
participate in an interview process designed to identify strategies to increasing economic 
independence.
4  Although all unemployed individuals are obliged to look for work and 
some are required to undertake additional activities (for example, voluntary work, work-
for-the-dole or training) which are expected to increase their chances of employment, in 
practice most of these recipients have little contact (other than receiving their payments) 
with the income-support system after the initial 12 months of benefit receipt.   
Given this, the intervention trailed by FaCS and analyzed here was designed to 
address the following questions. Is the increased contact inherent in an intensive 
                                                           
4 Although in some families it is the woman who receives unemployment benefits and the man who 
receives family benefits, this case is quite uncommon (about 10 per cent of partnered individuals selected 
for the trial were male) and for ease of exposition we will refer in the discussion to the more traditional 
case.  As income support recipients, both partners appear in administrative records. 
  3interview process helpful in increasing the economic participation of women in workless 
families?  Further, are outcomes for family benefits recipients enhanced if—rather than 
attending on their own—they and their unemployed partners attend a joint interview in 
which a joint plan for increased economic activity is developed?  Although our primary 
focus is on the economic activity of the family benefit recipient, we will also discuss the 
implications of the trial for social participation and for the activity levels of unemployed 
partners.  Random assignment into intervention and control groups provides the basis for 
evaluating the results of the trial.   
  Our results indicate that the overall effect of the interview process led to lower 
hours of work among family benefit recipients in the intervention group than the control 
group, but to greater participation and hours in job search and in study or training for 
work-related reasons.  At the same time, there were few significant differences in the 
effect of the interview process on the economic and social activity of women interviewed 
with and without their unemployed partners. 
  Both the background to and the implementation of the pilot are discussed in 
Section II, while Section III outlines several methodological issues and describes the 
estimation strategy.   Estimates of the impact of the intervention on the economic and 
social activity of women in workless families are presented in Section IV of the paper.  
These estimates are based on two data sources—survey data from the pilots themselves 
and administrative data from the income-support system.  Finally, conclusions can be 
found in Section V.   
 
II. The Workless Families Pilot 
  4The Workless Families Pilot was targeted towards workless Australian couples 
with school-aged children.  This pilot was one of three randomized trials conducted by 
FaCS between September 2000 and April 2001 involving interviews with 10,504 income-
support recipients nationwide.  These trials were targeted towards especially 
disadvantaged groups—in particular, workless families, the very long-term unemployed, 
and mature-aged unemployment benefit recipients—who are in some sense outside the 
mainstream of Australian service delivery.
 5  Evaluation of these trials was undertaken in 
order to inform a broader process of welfare reform.     
 
II.1 Background 
Australia—like many countries worldwide—is currently undergoing a process of 
welfare reform.  Two key features of the system which are worth noting are: 1) 
Unemployment benefits are non-contributory and funded from general revenue; and 2)  
Program participants (for unemployment and other benefits) are entitled to receive 
benefits for an unlimited time period provided that they meet eligibility requirements.  
The welfare reform process in Australia has primarily involved a tightening of the 
training and job search requirements for unemployment recipients and the introduction of 
job search requirements for other types of payments.  This has taken place under the 
moniker of "mutual obligations."  In general, more is being demanded of income-support 
recipients in the context of fulfilling one’s “obligation” to the broader community.  In 
addition to more intensive job search requirements, this includes participation in 
                                                           
5 See Breunig et al. 2003 for results of the trial targeted towards very long-term unemployed individuals. 
 
  5government make-work programs, participation in voluntary activities, or participation in 
socially constructive activities (which might be defined in numerous ways.)   
Against this backdrop, reducing the numbers of workless families has become a 
key policy objective.  In particular, a recent task force on welfare reform (McClure, 
2000) recommended that reducing the numbers of Australian families without work 
should be one of the government’s three principal targets for welfare reform.   
II.2 Income support programs 
  The Workless Families Pilot affected participants in two separate welfare 
programs which we describe briefly. 
  Parenting Payment is paid to the primary carer of a dependent child under the age 
of 16 in low-income families.  Parenting payment represents two separate programs—
Parenting Payment Single (PPS) and  Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP)—depending 
upon the status of the parent who receives the payment.  In this study, we only consider 
participants receiving PPP.  PPP is paid only to one member of the couple but the level of 
payment is determined by asset and income tests which apply to both partners.  Both 
partners are allowed to work.  (In our data, it is the woman who receives the PPP 
payment in 90% of the cases.  Thus we frame our discussion in those terms.)  At the time 
this study was undertaken there was no job search or other activity requirement for PPP 
recipients. 
  Newstart Allowance (NSA) is a payment to unemployed individuals over the age 
of 21 who are capable of undertaking work and available to begin employment 
immediately.  NSA is subject to income and asset tests and has a formal requirement that 
recipients engage in active job search.  Individuals are allowed to work for a small 
number of hours before benefit reductions occur. 
  6Both PPP and NSA are components of an income-support system managed by 
FaCS and administered by a large, service delivery organization known as Centrelink.  
There are also child care allowances (Child Care Benefit) and tax credits (Family Tax 
Benefit) for low-income families who work.  Even though families may take up work 
which makes them ineligible for the PPP or NSA payments, they would still receive some 
income support through these other programs.  The important distinction is that families 
on PPP and NSA are receiving the majority of their income from the income support 
system. 
II.3 Implementation 
The pilot was designed to assess whether an intensive interview with Centrelink 
staff and the development of a participation plan would improve economic and/or social 
activity among PPP recipients and their unemployed partners (NSA recipients).  Some 
PPP recipients were interviewed with their unemployed partners.  The others were 
interviewed alone.  Individuals (and couples) participating in the pilot were assisted in 
developing a participation plan that addressed their particular needs in overcoming their 
barriers to work or to achieving greater social participation.  Interviewers specifically 
asked participants to begin thinking about and planning for the time when their children 
would reach the age threshold and the family would no longer be eligible for family 
benefits.  The participation plans involved the identification and take-up of referrals to 
other government services, courses of study or training.  As with Joint Signing for JSA 
claims in the U.K. (see Bonjour, et al, 2002), one goal of the intervention was to bring 
recipients in closer contact with Centrelink offices. 
  7The process of the trial was as follow.  Eligible Centrelink sites from across 
Australia were randomly chosen to participate in the trial.
6  Sites were selected from the 
available list with a probability proportional to their populations of the pilot target 
groups.  Selected sites were randomly assigned as ‘intervention’ (thirty-two sites) or 
‘control’ sites (twenty-four) with three sites with large populations of the pilot target 
groups selected as both intervention and control group sites.  Next, eligible customers 
from each site were randomly selected until specified quotas for the Parenting Payment 
target group had been reached.
7  Family benefit (PPP) recipients were randomly assigned 
for interview with or without their unemployed (NSA) partners. 
   Centrelink contacted each individual selected for the intervention group by mail 
asking him or her to attend an interview (with or without partner.)  NSA partners of those 
family benefit recipients selected for interview with their partner received a separate letter 
along similar lines.  These letters formed one part of the intervention, which also 
involved two face-to-face interviews.
8
The first set of interviews was conducted in September and October 2000.   
Interviews were conducted by trained Centrelink staff.  Individuals were required to 
attend the interview, but subsequent participation in the trial was voluntary.  For those 
                                                           
6 Eligibility was restricted to sites which had a sufficient number (over 30) of Parenting Payment   
recipients.  Each site is in fact a cluster of Centrelink offices located in the same area and serviced by the 
same specialist Centrelink staff member who conducted the interviews.  The thirty-one sites used for the 
intervention group comprised eighty-four separate Centrelink offices 
7 One intervention site subsequently became unavailable for participation in the pilot, so the final number 
of intervention sites was thirty-one.  
8 A copy of the letter sent to those selected for interview with their partner is in the Appendix.  Letters for 
other participants of the pilot were suitably modified to reflect the target group to which they belonged.       
  8who agreed to participate, interviewers administered a detailed questionnaire designed to 
elicit information about individuals’ (and, where relevant, their partners’) employment 
and educational background, current circumstances, and goals and aspirations regarding 
economic and/or social participation.  The questionnaire also canvassed any barriers to 
increased participation faced by individuals to facilitate discussion between participants 
and their interviewers about how they could become more economically and socially 
active.  The outcome of that discussion was formalized in a participation plan, which may 
have included referrals to other government programs or forms of assistance.   
A second interview was conducted in November or December 2000.  This 
interview was used to identify how participants’ circumstances had changed and 
determine implementation of the participation plans, such as the take up of referrals to 
job training or educational programs.  A final telephone interview was conducted by an 
independent market research company in March and April 2001.   
Comparison of data from the first face-to-face interview (Wave 1) and the follow-
up telephone interview (Wave 3) forms the basis of the analysis of the impact of full 
participation in the trial.  We define “full treatment” to be receipt of the letter and 
participation in the two face-to-face interviews.       
Control group members were likewise sent letters informing them of the proposed 
interview process in September 2000.  Those who agreed were interviewed at the same 
three points in time as the intervention group by the market research firm that conducted 
the Wave 3 intervention group interviews.  The control group interviews were designed 
to elicit comparable information to that obtained from intervention group members at the 
various stages of the trial.  The initial control group interview also covered their 
aspirations and barriers to economic and/or social participation.   
  9There are thus two primary differences between the control and intervention 
groups—the formation of a participation plan and the much longer (and obviously 
costlier) face-to-face interviews with a Centrelink officer.  Even if the same questions 
were asked, one might expect individual’s responses and subsequent actions to differ 
when the questions, in the first case, are being asked over the phone by an independent 
market research firm relative to the second case where member of the organization which 
controls the individual’s welfare payments is asking the questions. 
The intervention was modest and there were no negative consequences for those 
who chose not to participate or who dropped out of the interview process before 
completing the entire intervention.  This reflects the constraints under which FaCS 
attempted to test  extending “mutual obligations” while avoiding exposure to criticism of 
being too harsh on income support recipients.  
II.4 Data sources  
In this analysis we will make use of two data sources:  detailed survey data from 
the pilot itself and administrative income-support data from FaCS's Longitudinal Data Set 
(LDS) merged to the pilot data.  The LDS provides fortnightly observations on benefit 
details (including benefit levels, reported income, both earned through work and 
unearned and duration of benefit receipt) and limited demographic characteristics (age of 
payment recipient, age of youngest child, geographic area, housing type and the like).  
The availability of these administrative data for all individuals selected for the pilot 
(irrespective of whether or not they participated) allows us to test random assignment and 
to assess the factors related to an individual's decision to fully participate in the treatment 
(or in the case of the control group to agree to be interviewed in all three Waves).  We 
discuss in more detail in the following sections how the administrative data were used. 
  10 
III.  Methodological Issues and Estimation Strategy 
  Random assignment into the control and intervention groups was intended to 
simplify estimation of the impact of the interview process on the economic and social 
activity of family benefit recipients (see Heckman et al. 1999).  However, a failure to 
achieve complete randomization, change in interview methods between Waves 1 and 3, 
and dropout from both the intervention and control groups (all discussed further below) 
lead us to prefer a non-experimental, propensity-score matching estimator over the 
simpler experimental estimator.   Still, the initial randomized design of the trial implies 
that intervention and control group members have similar observed characteristics and 
that outcomes and characteristics are generally measured in the same way for both 
groups.  These data features greatly enhance our ability to use propensity score matching 
to estimate the impact of the intervention.
9    
 
III.1 Randomization, Interview Methods, and Dropout 
  Analysis of our administrative data suggests that the initial assignment into the 
intervention versus control group is not completely random with respect to geographic 
location and nativity.   Members of the control group are significantly more likely to live 
in large, capital cities, while intervention group members are significantly more likely to 
                                                           
9 In particular, Heckman, et al., (1997) point to these data features as being crucial in reducing the bias in 
evaluation studies, along with subjects facing the same economic conditions.  Satisfaction of this latter 
requirement is less clear in this study, since randomization took place on the basis of sites.  Nevertheless, 
the regional variables we include should account for much of the variation in labor market conditions faced 
by subjects in the pilot.  
  11reside in towns with populations between 2,000 and 40,000 residents.  Similarly, relative 
to intervention group members, individuals in the control group are more likely to be 
immigrants from a non-English speaking country, and less likely to be Australian-born.
10  
These differences in local labor markets and nativity may be quite important in 
influencing the relative economic and social participation of pilot participants.  This is 
one of the central reasons why we use an estimation approach (see below) to control for 
these differences instead of a mean comparison across treatment and control groups. 
  At the same time, comparing the characteristics of the family benefit recipients 
assigned to the “individual” as opposed to the “joint” interview intervention groups 
suggests that randomization is not a large problem for this comparison.  Differences in 
the geographic distribution of these individuals—though significant—are small in 
magnitude.  Thus, it appears that the overall difficulty in achieving randomization 
between the control and the aggregated intervention group may stem from the process 
used to select intervention and control group sites and not with randomization within site.  
It is also important to note that although the same questionnaire was administered 
to intervention and control groups, different data gathering techniques – i.e., face-to-face 
and via telephone – were used for the control and two intervention groups in Waves 1 and 
2.  Wave 3 data were gathered by the same market research firm in the same way for all 
groups.  (See Table 1.)  Systematic differences in responses across the groups may 
therefore be due to the survey method itself and not due to the effect of the intervention.   
As we discuss below, this will complicate the interpretation of the results to a degree. 
                                                           
10  These patterns are likely to be related to the geographic clustering of immigrants to Australia.  Foreign-
born individuals—in particular, those from non-English speaking countries—are heavily concentrated in 
Australia’s capital cities.  Results of these randomization tests are available upon request.  
  12Table 1 Here 
  Finally, a substantial amount of dropping out occurred in both the control and 
intervention groups.  This is perhaps not surprising as the interview process is lengthy 
and poor couples with children may face high costs in participating in the interview.  
Furthermore, due to ethical and political considerations, we had no method of compelling 
individuals to participate.  Individuals who dropped out suffered no adverse 
consequences in terms of their income support receipt.  This explains the large dropout 
between Waves 1 and 2.  There is also a large dropout between Wave 2 (when interviews 
were face-to-face) and the Wave 3 phone interviews.
11   
Correlation between the decision to participate in the pilot once selected and 
individual characteristics could easily confound the effects of those characteristics and 
participation in the treatment on subsequent outcomes.
12 Treatment dropout is not an 
insurmountable problem and there are several strategies in the literature for dealing with 
treatment group dropout.
13   Heckman et al. (1998), for example, propose a method of 
estimating the “effect of the intention to treat” which can be calculated in the face of 
                                                           
11 Dropout between Waves 2 and 3 among the intervention group was high among those from non-English 
speaking backgrounds, presumably associated with the difficulties of communication in phone interviews.  
The differential dropout between those interviewed with partners and those without primarily reflects an 
administrative error.  The market research company collected information only from the first person of 
each household record, which lowered the response rate of the stream interviewed with their partners. 
12 In our case, participants who did not drop out were more likely to be Australian-born or immigrants with 
English-speaking backgrounds, live in major cities or towns, and own homes.  Not surprisingly, individuals 
who had moved in the last six months were less likely to participate.  Detailed results are available upon 
request. 
13 Control group dropout is an uncommon problem that has not been discussed in the literature. 
  13treatment dropout.  For programs which will be imperfectly implemented, this may in 
fact provide a more realistic estimate of the ‘real-world’ policy impact.   
Dropout is a particular problem, however, because we do not have complete 
survey data for intervention and control group members who chose not to participate in 
an interview (or who could not be contacted).  Although FaCS was able to deal with any 
ethical concerns associated with the initial random assignment, legal and ethical 
constraints regarding data privacy precluded collection of data from individuals opting 
out of the interview process. This complicates the analysis, but fortunately the availability 
of administrative data from the income-support system for all individuals (and their 
partners) selected for the trial allows us to adopt a non-experimental, propensity score 
matching approach to estimate the effect of the intervention.  
  
III.2 Estimation Strategy 
  We pursue a two-pronged approach.  First, we use survey data from the trial itself 
and attempt to estimate “treatment on the fully-treated”.  Second, we use administrative 
LDS information—which is available for all individuals selected for the trial—to 
estimate the “effect of intention to treat”.   Two sorts of comparisons will be made: first, 
between family benefits (PPP) recipients in the aggregated intervention group and family 
benefits (PPP) recipients in the control group and second, between family benefits (PPP) 
recipients in the two intervention groups.  This later comparison allows us to assess the 
marginal impact of participating in a joint interview (and developing a joint participation 
plan) as opposed to individual interview.   
  To illustrate, consider the first comparison.  We wish to compare the economic 
and social activity of those who fully participated in the interview process and developed 
  14a participation plan to that of individuals in the control group who would have done the 
same had they been selected for the intervention.  In other words we wish to estimate  
10 (| ,
TOFT EY Y X P 1 ) ∆ =− =      (1) 
where   and   are potential activity levels given completion and non-completion of 
the interview process respectively, 
1 Y
0 Y
X  is a vector of controls, and   when an 
individual completes the entire treatment and 0 otherwise.  We use propensity score 
matching techniques to overcome the practical difficulties associated with determining 
which comparison individuals would have completed the interview process had they been 
assigned to the intervention group.  
1 P =
  More specifically, we use the administrative LDS data for intervention group 
members to estimate a logit model of the probability of completing the final interview.
14  
Using these estimates, we then create a propensity score ( ) (predicted probability) for 
each family benefit recipient in the intervention and control group.  Using kernel 
propensity score matching, individuals in the intervention group are then matched to a 
weighted average of control group members with similar propensity scores.  Weights are 
positively related to the similarity in propensity scores.  The effect of full treatment for an 
individual i completing treatment (
ˆi p
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14 The results appear in Appendix Table A.1.  The variables included in the logit equation included age, 
gender, marital status, number of dependent children, birthplace, language background, indigenous status, 
housing type, rurality, income support duration and previous participation in labor market programs.  
  15where  ˆ
I
i p  and   are the propensity score and realized outcome for individual i in the 
fully-treated intervention group,   and   are the propensity score and realized 








0 is number of individuals in the 
control group.  We use a standard normal kernel for   and choose the bandwidth (h) 
using Silverman’s (1986) suggested robust bandwidth for density estimation.
K
15  T h e  
i δ from equation (2) are then averaged across members of the fully treated intervention 
group to generate a cross-sectional estimate of the effect of full-treatment on fully-treated 
individuals based on activity levels at the third interview.  We also use  i δ  to construct a 
standard difference-in-difference estimate of changes in activity levels between the first 
and third interviews.  Results from both measures are presented in Section IV. 
  In addition to the overall comparison between family benefit recipients in the 
intervention and control groups, we would also like to assess whether participation in the 
interview process with one’s partner (as opposed to alone) had any additional effect on 
economic and social activity.  In order to make this comparison, we repeat the above 
matching process taking family benefit recipients participating in an individual interview 
as the “control” group and those participating in a couple interview as the “intervention” 
group.  These results are also discussed in Section IV. 
  The probability density functions of the propensity scores for the intervention and 
control groups of those who survived to Wave 3 are presented in Figure 1 in the 
Appendix.  The propensity score density for the control group has more mass at smaller 
values, reflecting the greater concentration of individuals from non-English speaking 
backgrounds among that group and the negative effect that characteristic has on the 
                                                           
15 We tried bandwidths ranging from 0.001 to 0.05 and the qualitative results are insensitive to this choice. 
  16probability of full-participation.  In general, the matching procedure appeared to be 
satisfactory.
16  No match was found for three intervention group observations and these 
were dropped from the analysis.
17  
 
IV.  The Impact of the Interview Process on the Social and Economic Participation 
of Family Benefit Recipients 
 IV.1 The Interview Process and Economic and Social Activity: Survey Data Results 
  Detailed survey data for pilot participants allows us to estimate the impact of the 
interview process on the economic and social participation of those individuals who 
completed the final interview.  We concentrate on five measures of economic 
participation (paid employment, study or training for work-related reasons, voluntary 
work for work-related reasons, job search, and “total economic participation” which is 
defined as participation in any of these) and two measures of social participation (study 
or training and volunteer work undertaken for non work-related reasons).  In each case, 
we consider both total hours and overall participation in the specific activity.   
  Both the cross-sectional Wave 3 and the difference-in-difference estimates of the 
overall impact of FaCS’s interview process on the economic and social participation of 
family benefit (PPP) recipients partnered with men receiving unemployment benefits are 
                                                           
16 We followed the procedure proposed in Dehejia and Wahba (2002) to assess the balancing of the 
covariates.  This involves splitting observations into strata based on their propensity scores and testing for 
each stratum whether each covariate differs between the intervention and control groups.  About 5 per cent 
of the (500 or so) tests that the covariates were equal were rejected at the 5 per cent level.  The evidence 
from this procedure does not point to problems with covariate balancing. 
17 These were three intervention group observations whose propensity scores exceeded the maximum 
propensity score among control group observations. 
  17presented in Table 2.  While difference-in-difference estimators have the advantage of 
‘differencing out’ any time-invariant group-specific effects that might remain after 
matching, their validity rests on the assumption that any differential change in the relative 
activity levels of the two groups can be attributed solely to the effects of the treatment 
itself.  Changes in the method of interview (from face-to-face to telephone) for the 
intervention (but not control) group imply that this assumption may not hold in our case.  
This—along with our relative confidence in our ability to match individuals participating 
in the full interview process to comparable control group members (see Section III.2)—
leads us to have a preference for the cross-sectional estimates.     
Table 2 Here 
Our estimates imply that individuals participating in the full interview process had 
lower hours of (and participation in) paid work than members of the control group, but 
higher weekly hours of (and participation in) work-related study or training and job 
search.
18  In particular, the time spent in work-related study or training was one and a half 
hours per week higher amongst those participating in the full treatment.  These women 
spent more time in job search (approximately one hour per week), but less time 
(approximately one hour and 45 minutes) in paid employment each week.  Voluntary 
work for work-related reasons was also more common amongst women participating in 
the interviews with Centrelink advisors, though there was no significant difference in the 
hours the two groups spent in work-related volunteering.  Overall, although the average 
total hours spent in these economic activities was not significantly affected by the 
                                                           
18 Van der Berg and van der Klaauw (2001) found that a Dutch counselling and monitoring program for the 
unemployed made more formal job search more likely but no impact on exits to employment. 
  18intervention, there was a slight increase (seven percentage points) in the proportion of 
individuals engaged in some form of economic activity.   
There is also evidence that the interviews led to an increase in some forms of 
social participation.  Post-intervention, both hours of and participation in non work-
related study or training were higher for those women taking part in the interview 
process.
19    
These results provide evidence that interviews centering around future planning 
and the development of participation plans can lead to modest increases in the economic 
and social activity of family benefits recipients whose partners are unemployed.  Are 
these outcomes enhanced further when family benefit recipients participate in these 
interviews jointly with their unemployed partners?  In addressing this question, we 
compute both cross-sectional and difference-in-difference estimates that compare family 
benefit recipients participating in joint interviews (the “intervention group”) with family 
benefit recipients participating in individual interviews (the “control” group).  (See Table 
3.)  This provides estimates of the marginal impact of a joint as opposed to an individual 
interview.   Because the move from face-to-face interviews to telephone interviews 
occurred between Waves 2 and 3 for both groups (see Table 1), we are more confident 
that the identifying assumptions of the difference-in-difference estimator hold leading us 
to have a slight preference for the difference-in-difference estimates. 
Table 3 Here 
  There is no evidence that requiring family benefit recipients to participate in a 
joint interview and planning process with their partners leads to higher levels of 
                                                           
19 These results are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
 
  19economic or social activity.   Hours  of  (and participation in) paid work, study and 
training (whether for work or not), and volunteer work are all unaffected by the inclusion 
of one’s partner in the interview process.   In fact, difference-in-difference estimates 
suggest that participation in a joint–rather than single–interview resulted in a reduction in 
the hours that family benefit recipients spent looking for work each week.  Recall that 
both groups are interviewed alone by phone at the third wave, but at the first wave one 
group was interviewed in-person with partners while the other was interviewed in-person, 
but alone. This estimate will therefore also reflect any differential effect on reported job 
search arising from interview technique.
20
IV.2 The Interview Process and Economic and Social Activity: Administrative Data 
Results  
 
  One might reasonably be concerned about residual selection on unobservables in 
the take-up of the treatment (and in the full response to all three interviews for the control 
group.)  In particular, recipients who are already planning on going back to work might 
avoid the hassle of going to the interviews.  If that were the case and these recipients 
were more likely to take up jobs, then our estimate of the treatment effect presented 
above will be downward biased.  This is one possible explanation for the finding of a 
small, negative impact on working (hours and participation) in the intervention group.  
(Kamionka and Lacroix (2003) find a large bias in the experimental matching estimator 
in a situation with a similarly large amount of dropout--the Canadian Self-Sufficiency 
Project.) 
                                                           
20 There was an increase in job search activity among the unemployed partners of family benefits recipients 
who were part of the joint interview process compared to the partner control group. 
  20We can address this possibility, and at the same time, expand the number and type 
of outcome measures that we consider, using administrative data from the FaCS LDS 
which allow us to assess the impact of the intervention both on those who participated 
fully in the intervention and those who were assigned to it but did not participate fully.  
(This is similar to Kamionka and Lacroix who also use administrative data available for 
all participants, even the drop-outs.)  The outcome measures which are available to us in 
the administrative data are movement off of income support payments; the presence of 
earned income; and average earned income.   
 These outcomes are measured in June 2001, about two months after the completion 
of the trial.  This allows us to isolate any effects of assignment to the trial (the effect of 
intention to treat) from full participation (treatment on the fully treated).  We use average 
values
21 over two fortnights of data (from 17 May through 14 June 2001) to construct the 
outcome measures, which are reported in Table 4 for the total family benefits recipient 
group. 
The second column of Table 4 addresses the intention to treat, comparing the 
outcomes of all individuals assigned to the intervention group with all those assigned to 
the control group.  The third column compares the intervention group who participated 
fully in the intervention with the total (assigned) control group and the last column 
compares the fully participating intervention group with control group members who 
participated in the interviews through Wave 3. 
                                                           
21 We use average values to eliminate high frequency variation in the data.  Individuals sometimes 
disappear from the administrative data for one fortnight, only to return the following fortnight on the same 
payment type.  Logically, these can not be thought of as true departures from welfare receipt. 
  21Table 4 Here 
Overall, the administrative data provide important support for one key feature of the 
survey results: the impact of the intervention generally was small.  Nearly all (over 95 per 
cent) members of both intervention and control group remained on income support 
immediately after the conclusion of the trial.  
There are very few significant differences between the outcomes of members of the 
intervention group, either those assigned or participating fully, and those of the control 
group. (See Table 4.)  Intervention group members who participated at Wave 3 may have 
been more likely to remain on benefits than control group members.  This is consistent 
with the survey results which indicate that many intervention group participants remain 
engaged in job search and education and training as an outcome of the formation of their 
participation plan.  While these activities may eventually provide better longer-term 
outcomes, they result in a higher likelihood of remaining on payments in the short-term. 
In contrast to the survey results, members of the intervention appear more likely to 
report earned income (be employed) than control group members.  This is perhaps 
evidence that there is downward bias in the matching estimator based upon the 
experimental data (consistent with the findings in Kamionka and Lacroix, 2003).  The 
matching procedure may not fully control for all factors affecting selection into full 
treatment. 
In general, the effects appear to be modest.  Taken together, the survey and 
administrative data point to a significant take-up of training and education activities and 
consequently a higher probability of remaining on payments.  The results regarding short-
term employment effects are more ambiguous, but clearly small. 
IV.3 Robustness of the Results 
  22Alternative matching techniques produced estimated effects that were similar to those 
reported in Tables 2 through 4.
22  Similarly, where the matching procedures included use 
of the characteristics of the partners of family benefit recipients the impact estimates 
were similar to those already presented.  One explanation for this outcome is that the 
partners’ data added little new information to improve the matching procedure.  After all, 
the partners were all unemployed, overwhelmingly male and lived in the same regions in 
the same types of housing as the family benefit recipients.  The ages of members of the 
couples were also strongly correlated.  
The impact of the interview process on the outcomes of the NSA partners of the 
family benefit recipients was also similar to those achieved by the recipients themselves.  
The survey data suggest that unemployed NSA partners who participated fully in the pilot 
worked less in a job or as a volunteer and undertook more job search than NSA partners 
who were included in the control group.
23  There were similarly few differences in 
outcomes between unemployed partners in the intervention group and those in the control 
group in the FaCS administrative data.         
 
IV.4 Discussion 
These results provide evidence that interviews centered on future planning and the 
development of participation plans can lead to modest increases in economic activities by 
family benefits recipients and their unemployed partners.   That modest interventions lead 
to only modest successes is perhaps not surprising given the high level of correlation 
                                                           
22 These alternatives, available from the authors,  include other kernel weighting methods and nearest 
neighbour techniques. 
23 Survey and administrative data outcomes for this group are available on request.  
  23within couples in terms of characteristics and unemployment outcomes.  Worklessness 
may simply be concentrated within households that are particularly hard to help (Dorsett, 
2001).  The U.K.’s experience with JSA also suggests that it may take time for effects of 
policy interventions to materialize (Bonjour et al., 2002), and the outcomes we have 
measured here are rather short-term.    
 What is more surprising is the apparent substitution between market work and 
other activities. Compared with the control group, the planning process and its 
implementation may have lowered the hours and incidence of work by members of the 
intervention group.  This effect is observed in both the cross-sectional Wave 3 and 
difference-in-difference estimates reported in Table 2.  What behavioral responses or 
features of the trial may have brought about this employment effect?   
One possible explanation for the difference-in-difference result (though not the 
cross-sectional Wave 3 result) is that intervention group members may have overstated 
their participation and hours of work in their initial face-to-face interviews with 
Centrelink advisors.  The answers of individuals may have been more accurate in 
response to questions asked over the telephone by an employee of a market research 
company.  Alternatively, both the difference-in-difference and cross-sectional results 
could be explained by specific family responsibilities that constrain the time that family 
benefit recipients can allocate to other activities.  Any increase in non-work activities 
associated with the implementation of the participation plan may only have been possible 
at the expense of participation in or time spent on current employment.   
The data do not support either explanation, however.  Both participation in 
employment and average hours worked by those employed increased for members of the 
intervention group between the Wave 1 (face-to-face) and Wave 3 (telephone) interviews.  
  24The increases in employment and hours worked were simply greater for the control 
group.  In fact, participation in and total hours of economic activity (see Table 2) 
increased for both the intervention and control groups between the interviews.  These 
changes in economic participation are summarized in Table 5.  The increase in economic 
activity is similar for both groups between the interviews.  However, the increased 
activity is less employment-focused for the intervention group than the control group.    
Table 5 here 
  Individuals’ responses to Wave 3 interviews also do not suggest that they are so 
time constrained that they might not have been able to work if offered a job.  While these 
families all had dependent children, the trial was restricted to those families in which the 
youngest child was school-aged.  Furthermore, over one in four members of the 
intervention group engaged in voluntary work, most without specific work-related 
objectives.  This work may serve very valuable community purposes.  Nevertheless, such 
participation indicates there was potential flexibility among the intervention group in 
their allocation of time towards economic activities.  
It is difficult to know why the marginal effect of a joint interview was not greater.  
Evaluations of Joint Claims for JSA in the U.K. suggest that individuals—particularly 
men—participating in an interview with their partner were more likely to feel that the 
interview process had been helpful (Bonjour, et al, 2002).  In addition to facilitating the 
provision of required information, couples found joint interviews to be helpful because 
they allowed partners to support one another.  In their evaluation Bonjour, et al (2002), 
however, did not attempt to measure the impact of the mode of interview on subsequent 
outcomes.   Unlike in our case, couples were not randomly assigned to joint versus 
individual interviews, suggesting that selectivity may play a role in generating the U.K. 
  25results.  In this trial, however, the family payments recipients interviewed with their 
partners were no more likely than counterparts interviewed alone to indicate that they had 




The increasing concentration of unemployment and dependence on welfare within 
families is a serious policy concern.  Children growing up in such families are at 
particular risk of academic failure, social exclusion, and welfare dependence in 
adulthood.  With this in mind, the Australian Department of Family and Community 
Services conducted a randomized experiment to test a policy of intensive interviews with 
couples and individuals in workless families.  The interviews resulted in the formation of 
individual roadmaps toward increased economic and social participation.  This paper has 
reviewed that experiment and its outcomes. 
  Over the three waves of data collection associated with the trial, we find that both 
the control and intervention groups showed significant increases in economic activity.  
For control group members, this manifested itself as increased participation in paid work, 
while intervention group members showed significant increases in work-related study and 
training.  Both control and intervention groups participated in three interviews in a six-
month period—a stark contrast to the limited contact that this group would normally have 
with the welfare system.  That both groups responded to this contact is therefore not 
surprising.  The differential response may perhaps be explained by the formation of 
participation plans in the face-to-face interviews with the intervention group.  For this 
                                                           
24 Family benefit recipients (who are predominately female) interviewed with their partners were 
significantly more likely than their (male) partners to indicate that they had found the interview helpful. 
  26group of individuals who are entrenched in unemployment, job counselors may help in 
moving people towards richer economic participation through training and study 
programs. 
  The differences we find between the control and intervention groups are fairly 
small.  Three things mitigate against finding larger results.  First, both groups increased 
economic participation in response to the trial. Given this, there may have been less 
potential for there to be a marginal impact of the interview process itself.  Secondly, the 
interviews for both groups were voluntary.  There was no penalty for refusing to 
participate in the trial or for dropping out of the trial.  Thirdly, the time frame of analysis 
is fairly short.     
Interestingly, we also find no differential impact on outcomes for individuals 
interviewed together as a couple compared to individuals interviewed alone.  
  This study provides further evidence that moving individuals entrenched in 
unemployment off welfare is a difficult task.  Unemployed individuals in workless 
families are among the most disadvantaged of welfare recipients.  Nonetheless, the small, 
voluntary intervention studied here was successful in increasing certain forms of 
economic participation.  Nevertheless, it seems that any welfare reform process that has 
as its goal the reduction in workless families requires a longer-term perspective than the 
time frame examined here.  The resources required by a successful program are also 
likely to be greater than those expended in this intervention.    
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Table 1 
 
Sample sizes at the various interviews, etc. 
 
 Intervention  Control 







      
Letters sent  1380  991  1413 
      
Interviewed in Wave 1     983  715    396 
       
Interviewed in Wave 2     430  652    315 
       
Interviewed in Wave 3     147  309    244 
       
      
Data gathered in face-to-face interview   
Data gathered in phone interview   
 
 
  32Table 2: 
Economic Participation for PPP Recipients: Intervention versus Control Group  
(Cross-Sectional and Difference-in-Difference Propensity Score Matching Impact Estimates) 
Economic Participation Measures 
 
Wave 3  Difference in 
Difference 
Wave 3  Difference in 
Difference 
Average Weekly Hours  Proportion Working 
Intervention Group  1.56  0.49  0.11  0.04 
Control Group  3.30  2.24  0.17  010 
Impact Estimate    -1.73**       -1.75 ***   -0.06 *    -0.07 ** 
Standard Error  (0.71)  (0.66)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Hours Study or Training (Work)  Proportion Studying or 
Training (Work) 
Intervention Group  2.22  2.05  0.11  0.10 
Control Group  0.92  -0.36  0.06  0.00 
Impact Estimate         1.30 ***          2.41 ***       0.05 **         0.10 *** 
Standard Error  (0.47)  (0.50)  (0.02)  (0.02) 




Intervention Group  0.22  -0.11  0.05  0.01 
Control Group  0.24  0.15  0.01  -0.01 
Impact Estimate  -0.02  -0.26      0.03 **  0.02 
Standard Error  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
  Hours Looking for Work  Proportion Looking for Work 
Intervention Group  2.38  0.29  0.35  0.02 
Control Group  1.35  -0.31  0.27  0.03 
 
Impact Estimate        1.03 ***  0.60      0.08 **  -0.01 
Standard Error  (0.38)  (0.56)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
  Total Hours Economic 
Participation 
Proportion in Economic 
Participation 
Intervention Group  6.46  2.87  0.48  0.11 
Control Group  5.78  1.77  0.41  0.10 
        
Impact Estimate  0.68  1.10   0.07*  0.00 
Standard Error  (0.98)  (0.97)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Notes:   1. Bandwidth for kernel match is 0.027.  Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
2. *** significant 1 percent; ** significant 5 percent; * significant 10 percent. 
3. Sample sizes vary due to missing data for some questions and range between 236 – 244 
(control) and 438 – 457 (intervention).  For this reason, the total hours estimates are not the sum 
of the individual elements.  Total participation is also not the sum of the individual elements 
because individuals may participate in more than one activity. 
 
  33Table 3:    
Economic Participation for PPP Recipients Interviewed with and without Partners  
(Cross-Sectional and Difference-in-Difference Propensity Score Matching Impact Estimates) 
Economic Participation Measures 
 
Wave 3  Difference in 
Difference 
Wave 3  Difference in 
Difference 
Average Weekly Hours  Proportion Working 
Interview with Partner  1.27  0.72  0.09  0.03 
Interview without Partner  1.71  0.36  0.13  0.04 
Impact Estimate  -0.44  0.37  -0.04  -0.01 
Standard Error  (0.71)  (0.58)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Hours Study or Training   Proportion Studying or 
Training  
Interview with Partner  1.66  1.60  0.08  0.07 
Interview without Partner  2.39  2.22  0.11  0.11 
Impact Estimate  -0.73  -0.62  -0.03  -0.04 
Standard Error  (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
  Hours of Voluntary Work   Proportion Volunteering  
Interview with Partner  0.23  -0.24  0.07  0.03 
Interview without Partner  0.24  -0.03  0.04  0.01 
Impact Estimate  -0.01  -0.21  0.03  0.02 
Standard Error  (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
  Hours Looking for Work  Proportion Looking for Work 
Interview with Partner  2.74  -1.16  0.38  -0.03 
Interview without Partner  2.30  0.92  0.34  0.03 
 
Impact Estimate  0.44    -2.07**  0.04  -0.06 
Standard Error  (0.73)  (1.00)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
  Total Hours   Proportion Participating 
Interview with Partner  6.00  0.94  0.47  0.03 
Interview without Partner  6.68  3.61  0.48  0.14 
        
Impact Estimate  -0.69   -2.68*  -0.01   -0.11* 
Standard Error  (1.33)  (1.47)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Notes: 
1.  Bandwidth for kernel match is 0.027.  Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
2.  ***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent; *significant at  10 percent. 
3.  Sample sizes vary due to missing data for some questions and  range 127 – 136 (partner 
interviewed) and 297 – 307    (partner not interviewed). For this reason, the total hours estimates 
are not the sum of the individual elements.  Total participation is also not the sum of the individual 
elements because individuals may participate in more than one activity. 
  34Table 4:    
Economic Participation for PPP Recipients: Intervention versus Control Group  
Administrative Data Measures 
 
All individuals assigned to 
intervention and control groups
Wave 3 intervention group 








assigned to the 
control group 
Wave 3 control 
group 
participants 
On payments June 2001 (%)      
        
Intervention 0.965  0.965  0.991  0.991 
Control 0.965  0.965  0.967  0.971 
Impact estimate  0.000  0.000       0.024***    0.020* 
Standard error  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Has earnings June 2001 (%)      
        
Intervention 0.047  0.047  0.059  0.059 
Control 0.027  0.031  0.030  0.035 
Impact estimate       0.020***  0.016     0.029**  0.024 
Standard error  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
Average earnings June 2001 ($)      
        
Intervention 11.8  11.8  15.9  15.9 
Control 7.9  9.5  8.9  12.0 
Impact estimate   3.9*  2.3  6.9  3.8 
Standard error  (2.3)  (5.5)  (5.5)  (7.2) 
Average earnings June 2001 given had earnings ($) 
        
Intervention 251.3  252.1  278.4  284.1 
Control 294.8  290.6  304.9  403.0 
Impact estimate  -43.5  -38.5  -26.4  -118.9 
Standard error  (48.0)  (95.4)  (153.8)  (153.8) 
Notes: 
1.  Bandwidth for kernel match for column two is 0.019; for columns three and four it is 0.027.  
Standard errors are bootstrapped for columns two to four. 
2.  ***significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent; *significant at  10 percent. 
3.  Sample sizes:  for column two, 2346 intervention group members, 1413 controls; for column three, 
457 intervention group members, 1413 controls; for column four, 457 intervention group members, 
244 controls. 
  35Table 5: 
Change in Economic Participation for PPP Recipients between Waves 1 and 3: 







Between Wave 1 and Wave 3:     
  Increase in the proportion participating 




  Proportion employed who were 
  previously not economically active 
2.3 5.5 
  Proportion employed who were 
  previously economically active, but not 
 employed 
4.3 6.4 
Between Wave 1 and Wave 3:     
  Increase in the proportion working  4.3  11.0 
  Increase in the proportion participating 
  in other economic activities 
10.6 11.6 
Notes: 
1.  This categorization of activities or outcomes is incomplete.  For example, small numbers of individuals 
employed at Wave 1 were not employed at Wave 3 and some were no longer participating in economic 
activities.   
2.  These proportions are measured relative to the total intervention and control groups.  For example, the 
increase in individuals who participated in non-work economic activities between Waves 1 and 3 
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   Demographic Characteristics    
       Age   0.18 0.09 2.05 0.30 0.16  1.89 
       Age Squared  -0.21 0.10 -2.05 -0.35 0.19  -1.85 
       Female   0.16 0.20 0.80 -0.001 0.31  0.00 
       Married (Not Defacto)   0.17 0.14 1.21 0.09 0.25  0.36 
       Aboriginal  -0.96 0.45 -2.16 -0.89 0.75  -1.18 
      Has disability  -0.62 0.55 -1.14 0.53 0.66  0.81 
  Dependent Children    
       Age of Youngest Child  0.01 0.02 0.49 0.02 0.04  0.52 
       Two Children   0.08 0.14 0.56 0.58 0.23  2.49 
       Three Children  0.22 0.17 1.34 0.37 0.30  1.25 
       Four of More Children   0.13 0.25 0.50 0.21 0.46  0.46 
  Birthplace    
      Overseas NESB   -0.96 0.16 -5.81 -0.93 0.30  -3.11 
       Overseas ESB   0.38 0.20 1.91 0.26 0.36  0.72 
  Living Circumstances    
       Moved in Last 6 months  -0.68 0.15 -4.51 -0.22 0.21  -1.02 
       Home Owner  0.42 0.13 3.20 0.23 0.22  1.05 
       Government Rental  0.27 0.17 1.59 -0.13 0.32  -0.40 
       Boarding  -1.62 1.03 -1.57 -0.53 1.06  -0.50 
       Other Arrangements  -0.22 0.29 -0.76 -0.40 0.51  -0.79 
      Capital City   -0.01 0.18 -0.06 -0.41 0.33  -1.24 
      Major City  0.52 0.21 2.40 0.23 0.35  0.66 
      Towns  0.37 0.19 1.98 0.15 0.31  0.49 
  Reported Income (1/00 to 6/00)    
      Earnings  0.06 0.21 0.27 -0.69 0.46  -1.52 
      Unearned Income   0.32 0.14 2.35 0.50 0.23  2.21 
  Payment History (Since 7/95)    
       Time on Parenting Pay.  -0.02 0.03 -0.56 -0.09 0.06  -1.59 
       Participated in      
             Intensive Assistance  -0.57 0.64 -0.89 -0.18 0.88  -0.20 
             Training Program  -0.35 0.64 -0.55 0.93 0.81  1.15 
        Received an Exemption  -0.06 0.53 -0.11 -0.45 1.11  -0.40 
        Had Admin. Breach  1.11 0.96 1.16 (a)    
        Had Activity Breach  1.92 1.05 1.82 2.67 1.52  1.76 
Observations  2358  1374 
Likelihood Ratio    
2 Χ  (28 df) = 163.3 
2 Χ  (27 df) = 61.8 
Prob. >   
2 Χ 0.000  0.0002 
Psuedo R
2 0.0702  0.0693 
  (a) There was no variation in this variable for this equation. 
Workless Families Pilot-Component 1 - Letter requesting couples to attend 
together- PPP Partner letter. 
  38        CRN: 
        Reference Code: 
Dear (name) 
 
My name is (name).  I am a Centrelink specialist customer adviser and my job is to help 
couples who don’t have paid work to start thinking about their future plans. There are 
many ways that couples can work together to combine looking after children with 
planning for future jobs.  I can talk to you about making the most of the opportunities that 
exist now for you, and help you to make a plan that suits you both.  
 
I have arranged an interview with you and your partner at: 
 
Centrelink (address of office)  
At (time) on (day and date). 
 
 
The request for you to attend the office at the time stated above is made under section 63 
of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999.  It is important to note that if you do 
not attend this interview your Parenting Payment may be stopped. 
 
I have sent a similar appointment letter to your partner. 
 
At the interview I will check both your details to make sure you are getting all the 
assistance you are entitled to.  As part of a new pilot programme, I will also be available 
to discuss with you both, your plans for the future and how I can help you.  If you wish to 
bring your children along, that is fine. Whilst you must attend this interview to have your 
payment details checked, further involvement in this pilot is voluntary. This pilot 
programme is confidential and free from cost or obligation. 
 
In order for this interview to be of most benefit to your family, I nee d to talk to you and 
your partner together.  If the interview time is not suitable for either you or your partner, 
please ring me to make another time.  If you have very strong reasons for not being 
interviewed with your partner, please ring me about this. 
 
I can be contacted on (Phone Number).  If you don’t have a phone and need to use a 
public phone or a friend’s phone, the best time to ring me is between (time) and (time) on 
(days).   
 
The total interview should take around 70 minutes.  You do not need to bring anything 
except this letter with you.  When you arrive at the office, please hand this letter to the 
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alone 
        CRN: 




My name is (name).  I am a Centrelink specialist customer adviser and my job is to help 
families who don’t have paid work to start thinking about their future plans. There are 
many ways that couples can work together to combine looking after children with 
planning for future jobs.  I can talk to you about making the most of the opportunities that 
exist now for you, and help you to make a plan that suits your family.  
 
 
I have arranged an interview with you at: 
 
Centrelink (address of office)  
At (time) on (day and date). 
 
 
The request for you to attend the office at the time stated above is made under section 63 
of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999.  It is important to note that if you do 
not attend this interview your Parenting Payment may be stopped. 
 
At the interview I will check your details to make sure you are getting all the assistance 
you are entitled to.  As part of a new pilot programme, I will also be available to discuss 
with you your plans for the future and how I can help you.  If you wish to bring your 
children along, that is fine. Whilst you must attend this interview to have your payment 
details checked, further involvement in this pilot is voluntary. This pilot programme is 
confidential and free from cost or obligation. 
 
I can be contacted on (Phone Number).  If you don’t have a phone and need to use a 
public phone or a friend’s phone, the best time to ring me is between (time) and (time) on 
(days).   
 
The total interview should take around 45 minutes.  You do not need to bring anything 
except this letter with you.  When you arrive at the office, please hand this letter to the 
officer at reception. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
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